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Abstract  2 
ABSTRACT 
Title: “Design elements that Influence the Participation of Solvers in Innovation Contests” 
Author: Daniel Gadit Mendes 
 
This study analyzes all of the innovation contests, also known as crowdsourcing contests, 
posted on the Inocrowd platform. Inocrowd is an open innovation intermediary firm, based in 
Portugal, that hosts crowdsourcing contests for firms, called “seekers” looking to solve 
innovation challenges. The main aim of this study is to examine to what extent some design 
elements of crowdsourcing contests can influence the participation of “solvers” in these 
contests. The design elements considered in this study are the monetary award amount, the 
project type, the platform maturity and the anonymity of “seeker” firms. We then created a 
mathematical model that can be used to predict the participation of “solvers” in crowdsourcing 
contests, based on the design elements examined. This paper contributes to the growing 
research field of open innovation, particularly crowdsourcing contests hosted by intermediary 
firms, and will provide managers with a framework for designing innovation contests with 
more participation.  
Keywords: Open innovation, Intermediaries, Crowdsourcing, Design elements  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Abstract  3 
RESUMO 
Título: “Elementos de Design que influenciam a participação de solvers em concursos de 
inovação” 
Autor: Daniel Gadit Mendes 
 
Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar todos os concursos de inovação, ou concursos de 
crowdsourcing, colocados na plataforma Inocrowd. A Inocrowd e um intermediário de 
inovação aberta, sediada em Portugal, que coloca concursos de crowdsourcing para empresas, 
conhecidas como ”seekers”, que procuram resolver desafios de inovação. O objetivo primário 
deste estudo é examinar até que ponto alguns elementos de design destes concursos de inovação 
influenciam a participação de investigadores, de nome “solvers”, nestes concursos. Os 
elementos de design considerados nesta investigação são a valor do prémio monetário, o tipo 
de projeto, a maturidade da plataforma e o anonimato dos “seekers”. Um modelo matemático 
foi desenvolvido no âmbito de prever a participação dos “solvers” nos concursos de 
crowdsourcing colocados na plataforma Inocrowd, baseado nos elementos de design 
examinados. Este estudo contribui para área de pesquisa crescente que e a Inovação aberta, 
particularmente na área dos concursos de crowdsourcing colocados por intermediários de 
inovação, tendo como objetivo fornecer aos gestores uma estrutura para criar concursos de 
inovação com mais participação. 
Palavras chave: Inovação aberta, Intermediários, Crowdsourcing, Elementos de design 
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1. Introduction 
Companies are looking for fresh innovation strategies aiming to shorten innovation cycles, to 
reduce escalating costs of industrial R&D, to cope with globalization of research technologies, 
and the lack of natural resources (Enkel and Gassmann, 2004). 
In 2003, Chesbrough described a paradigm shift in innovation models, from a closed to an open 
model. The open model suggests that when companies want to improve and update their 
technology, they should take advantage of external as well as internal ideas, and use internal 
and external paths to market (Chesbrough, 2005). Open innovation views research and 
development as an open system, hence valuable ideas that come from inside or outside the 
company can and should be taken to market internally or externally, with the main goal of 
capturing the value from any idea (Chesbrough, 2005). 
The concept of Open innovation was first used in 2003, when Chesbrough introduced the term 
defining it as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal 
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively” (Chesbrough, 
2005). Chesbrough created this definition by grouping different concepts, that had been in use 
previously, related to the sharing of information between organizations and the acquisition of 
external information, such as, absorptive capacity (Zahra, 2001), complementary assets (Teece, 
1986), the exploration and exploitation argument (March 1991) and user integration (Henkel 
and Von Hippel, 2005) and others.  
In 2004, Enkel and Gassmann identified three core processes that differentiate open innovation 
from previous models: (1) The outside-in process, which companies use to enrich their own 
knowledge base through the integration of suppliers, customers, and external knowledge 
sourcing thus increasing a company’s innovativeness. For example, IBM’s solution lab in 
Rüschlikon, integrates external knowledge in research projects and finds partners for joint 
ventures. Access to this external knowledge is one of the main assets of the solution lab and 
provides it with a high status within IBM’s research (Gassmann and Enkel, 2004). 
(2) The inside-out process: This process deals with external exploitation of ideas in different 
markets, selling IP and multiplying technology by channeling ideas to the external 
environment. Big Pharmaceutical companies often engage in this type of open innovation, for 
example, often, drugs were developed to treat specific conditions but became known by being 
used to treat different health issues, such as Viagra, which was originally used to control blood 
pressure, but enjoyed great success as a sexual aid (Enkel and Gassmann, 2004). 
(3) The coupled process links outside-in and inside-out processes by working in alliances with 
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complementary companies. The European space agency provides a good example of the 
coupled process of open innovation, because it is forced to jointly develop satellites with 
various European partners (Enkel and Gassmann, 2004). 
 The outside-in process allows companies to acquire knowledge from external sources, such as 
universities, suppliers, customers and others, which can then be integrated in the company 
(Mention, 2011). Companies usually have two motivations when looking for outside 
innovations, to access innovations, that are not owned by the firm, and to improve efficiency 
through economies of scale (West and Bogers, 2014). Evidence shows that firms engage more 
in the outside-in process than in the inside-out process (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). 
Hence, the outside-in process is an important vehicle for companies to increase their 
innovativeness (Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
Furthermore, when companies look outside for technologies, they reduce financial risk by 
investing in technology that has been used in other applications (Chesbrough and Crowther 
,2006). A good example of the importance of leveraging external sources of knowledge, can 
be found at SAP or Microsoft who have opened decentralized research laboratories, in places 
such as universities, in order to increase their absorptive capacity of “inbound” innovation 
(Gassmann, Enkel and Chesbrough, 2010). It is important to note, however, that the open 
innovation phenomenon is not limited to large high-tech industries, it has spread to other 
industries such as  machinery and, fast moving consumer goods and much more (Gassmann, 
Enkel and Chesbrough, 2010). Chesbrough and Crowther’s study of 12 companies across 
different industries showed that all 12 companies engaged in some open innovation practices 
(Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006).  
Dahlander and Gann, divided inbound innovation into pecuniary activities (acquiring) and non-
pecuniary activities (sourcing) and found that some companies spend too much time searching 
for external innovations when sourcing for external innovations (Dahlander and Gann, 2010), 
hence having a good partner would allow companies to reduce time spent on the activities 
mentioned above. They also showed that, when acquiring external knowledge, the 
effectiveness of openness depends of the quality of the resources of the partnering organization 
(Dahlander and Gann, 2010), hence it is important for the seeker firms to find the best 
partnering organization. Fortunately, there are now intermediary firms that assist firms in the 
information scanning and gathering functions and the communication function (Howells, 
2006). These intermediaries allow companies to engage in inbound innovation without having 
to worry too much about scanning and gathering of relevant information. There is also the issue 
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of the “Innovation Gap”, the separation of the research and the business communities (Dazniel, 
2010), as a consequence of the differences of measures and performance goals of these two 
separate communities (Partha and David, 1994). It has been showed that innovation 
intermediaries are the only firms that operate in the “Innovation Gap” purposefully, and are 
able to enhance the capacities of different innovation systems by intermediating between the 
business and research communities (Dazniel, 2010). An Innovation intermediary is “An 
organization or body that acts as an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation process 
between two or more parties.” (Howells, 2006). Moreover, these open innovation 
intermediaries, have begun to find specific technological solutions, through the use of external 
parties, known as “solvers”, to answer to specific technological challenges of various firms, 
called “seekers”.  
Past studies have also identified several types of innovation intermediaries, differentiated by 
their activities :(1) interorganizational networking activities; (2) technology development and 
related activities, (3) and other activities (Dazniel, 2010). The focus of this study is in the first 
category, interorganizational networking activities, where intermediaries work to create 
interorganizational networks where knowledge and resources are traded openly between the 
members of the network. NineSigma (2000) and Innocentive (2001) are two examples of 
internet based platforms that focus on transferring knowledge (Chesbrough, 2006) and have 
created a new industry by dramatically changing the innovation spectrum (Hossain, 2012). 
These platforms have become increasingly important to companies because they (1) facilitate 
technology communication internally and externally, (2) connect innovation providers to 
innovation seekers, (3) help companies screen external markets and understand the technology 
market better, (4) make searching tasks easier for companies, (5) reduce search costs for the 
companies (Hossain, 2012). The type of intermediaries considered in this study use 
crowdsourcing contests, also known as open innovation contests, to come up with innovative 
solutions for a “seeker’s” technological challenges. 
A crowdsourcing contest, or open innovation contest (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008), can be defined 
as a “problem solving process by disclosing the details of the problem at hand and inviting the 
participation of anyone who deems himself qualified to solve the problem” (Jeppesen and 
Lakhani, 2008).  Previous studies on open innovation contests have primarily focused on 
incentives to participate, award size and structure, the optimal size of the solver pool, entry 
criteria, tournament design and how these factors affect the effectiveness of innovation contests 
(Che and Gale, 2003). 
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The optimum number of solvers for a seeker firm, in a crowdsourcing contest, has been 
investigated before, and in 1999, Mcafee and Fullerton showed that, for seekers, the ideal 
solution space is to have 2 solvers working in the contest. Having to many solvers working on 
a problem leads to a lower equilibrium effort for each solver, which is not desirable for seeker 
firms (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008), this is known as the “competition effect”. However, seeker 
firms benefit from a larger solver population because that leads to a more diverse set of 
solutions submitted (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008), this is called the “parallel path effect”. Hence, 
according to the “parallel path effect”, it is preferable for innovation platforms to maximize 
participation because it increases the quality of the best solution and benefits innovation by 
broadening the search for solutions (Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani, 2008; Terwiesch and 
Xu, 2008; Lakhani et al., 2007). Interestingly, Boudreau, Lacetera and Lakhani (2008) showed 
that the two effects coexist, but at different levels. However, in this study we consider that for 
a start-up intermediary firm that hosts crowdsourcing contests in Portugal, the “parallel path 
effect” is more relevant since both the intermediary and the seeker firm are mostly concerned 
with the quality of the best solution. Hence, we will investigate how design elements mentioned 
below influence participation in crowdsourcing contests, hosted by a crowdsourcing 
intermediary in Portugal, and we will develop a model that shows how each design element 
affects participation in crowdsourcing contests. 
The effects of the monetary award on the participation of solvers show that the higher the 
reward, the higher the participation of solvers (Di Palantino and Vojnovic, 2009 ; Zheng, Li, 
and Hou, 2011; Yang et al., 2009) and the better the quality of solutions submitted (Archak and 
Sundararajan, 2009). Secondly, the effects of Platform Maturity (Walter and Back, 2011) on 
the participation of solvers in crowdsourcing contests will be analyzed Platform maturity, is 
the overall age of the marketplace, and past investigations have showed the existence of 
positive network effects in open innovation platforms, which means that over time there is a 
growing population of solvers registered in the platform which means that the innovation 
contests will benefit from more participation (Snir and Hitt, 2003; Yang et al, 2009; Walter and 
Back, 2011). Thirdly, the platform maturity was investigated. The platform maturity is the 
overall age of the platform and past investigation show that increases platform maturity leads 
to heightened levels of participation (Yang et al., 2009). Terwiesch and Xu (2008) looked at 
types of contests, showing that different types could be defined according to the technical and 
market uncertainty: ideation, trial and error, and expertise based projects. Past studies show 
that different project types are influenced by certain design elements of the contest (Boudreau, 
Lacetera, and Lakhani, 2008), and that ideation projects capture the highest number of solvers 
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of the three types (Yang et al., 2009; Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). The last design element 
considered is the anonymity of the seekers. To our knowledge this variable has never been 
investigated before. Past literature focuses on the reputation of seeker firms and states that 
solvers are more likely to register for challenges of seekers with strong brand strength (Walter 
and Back, 2011). Walter and Back (2010) showed similar results in a qualitative study of four 
crowdsourcing case studies. Understanding the effects of seeker anonymity on the participation 
of solvers would help companies to decide whether or not they should remain anonymous when 
broadcasting their innovation challenges, through the use of crowdsourcing contests hosted by 
intermediary firms. 
In summary, past investigations have showed that participation of solvers in crowdsourcing 
contests is influenced by award amount, project time cost, description length, contest duration, 
project type and marketplace maturity (Yang, Chen, and Pavlou, 2009). This study investigates 
some easily adjustable design elements of crowdsourcing contests, hosted by intermediary 
firms, namely the monetary award, the problem description length, project type, platform 
maturity, and the anonymity of the seeker firm. This study allowed us to develop a model that 
accurately explains the participation of solvers in crowdsourcing contests. 
This work analyzes the Inocrowd Platform. InoCrowd is a Portuguese crowdsourcing 
intermediary firm, that hosts “open call” innovation contests. Portugal is a very interesting case, 
since it is a small country recovering from a recession mainly by investing in technology, hence 
this type of business should experience exponential growth.  Identifying design elements that 
directly influence participation of solvers, would be extremely valuable for crowdsourcing 
intermediaries and for “seeker firms, because these findings could be used to design more 
effective crowdsourcing contests.
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2. Literature Review 
 2.1 Open Innovation 
Currently Open innovation research is an important and diverse topic. Since its first definition 
in 2003 by Chesbrough, it experienced exponential growth in practice and in research. 
Individual companies have proclaimed their success with their versions of open innovation, 
such as Procter and Gamble’s Connect and Develop program (Huston and Sakkab, 2006) 
Traditionally, Innovation was confined to R&D labs and was very firm specific, hence large 
scale dedicated R&D functions, in many industries, provided entry barriers to competitors 
through economies of scale (Teece, 1986). These benefits of scale lead to a vertically integrated 
model of innovation where large enterprises internalized their firm specific R&D activities and 
commercialized them through internal development, manufacturing and distribution processes 
(Chesbrough, 2003). This is known as the “closed” model of innovation.  
This model of “closed” innovation lead to many innovations in the past, however it also shed 
some light to some issues associated with it, such as the Not Invented Here Syndrome (Katz 
and Allen, 1985), and the Spillover effect, where basic research generates a lot of spillovers 
from which, firms, who had funded the research, had limited ability to capture value from 
(Nelson, 1959). Finally, in 1996 Rosenbloom and Spencer were already showing that this 
model of innovation was “at the end of an era” (Rosenbloom and Spencer, 1996). 
The open model allowed for new opportunities not possible in the “closed” innovation model. 
Firstly, the importance given to external knowledge in the “closed” innovation model is very 
limited, however by opening up the innovation process, equal weight is given to external 
knowledge, in comparison to internal knowledge, this reflects the fact that not all good ideas 
come from inside the firm (Chesbrough, 2003). Secondly, the purposive outbound flow of 
knowledge and technology are not addressed in a “closed” innovation model, whereas in an 
open model outward flow of technology allows firms to let technologies, that would otherwise 
not be used by the firm (spillovers), seek an external path to the market, and hence the firm is 
able to capture some value out of these technologies (Chesbrough, 2003). 
Thirdly, the massive knowledge landscape is almost never used in a “closed” model of 
innovation, even though companies should always be open to outside innovation (Rigby and 
Zook, 2002), because it allows them to reduce risk by investing in technology that has been 
tested and used in other applications (Chesbrough and Crowther, 2006). The open innovation 
model, states that useful knowledge is widely distributed and of general high quality which can 
and should be used by firms in their innovation quest (Chesbrough, 2003).  Thus, companies 
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must use external ideas as well as internal ideas, to advance their technology (Chesbrough, 
2003). Open innovation, uses processes to combine both sources of ideas into building their 
own architectures and systems. The requirements for these architectures and systems are 
determined by business models, which allow the two sources of ideas to create value 
(Chesbrough, 2006). Enkel and Gassmann identified three core processes of innovation “(1) 
The outside-in process: which enriches a company’s own knowledge base through the 
integration of suppliers, customers, and external knowledge. (2) The inside-out process: The 
external exploitation of ideas in different markets, selling IP and multiplying technology by 
channeling ideas to the external environment. (3) The coupled process: Linking outside-in and 
inside-out by working in alliances with complementary companies during which give and take 
are crucial for success.” (Enkel and Gassmann, 2004). These processes show why it is 
important to have a full understanding of how and where open innovation can add value in 
knowledge intensive-processes (Enkel, Gassmann and Chesbrough, 2009). The “outside-in” or 
“inbound” process of open innovation is the one that has been most researched, in terms of 
profiting from outside innovations (West and Bogers, 2013). In fact, the “outside-in” process 
has even, been shown empirically to increase company's innovativeness (Laursen and 
Salter,2006; Piller and Walcher, 2006). Accordingly, this process, allows companies to acquire 
knowledge from external sources, such as universities, suppliers, competitors, and customers, 
which can then be integrated into the company itself (Mention, 2011). Although these are the 
knowledge sources that companies use the most, Enkel and Gassmann (2008) showed that a 
very large number of other sources are used by companies, such as non-customers, and non-
competitors (Enkel and Gassmann, 2008).  
Due to the outside-in process, there is now, more awareness of the importance innovation 
networks, and of the role of innovation intermediaries, such as Inocrowd or Innocentive, that 
help companies increase their innovativeness, by connecting innovation seekers with 
innovation providers, by screening external markets and understanding the technology market 
better, and to reduce search costs for the companies (Hossain, 2012). 
 
2.2 Innovation Intermediaries 
Innovation intermediaries have become increasingly important for companies because, they 
connect innovation seekers to innovation providers, they help companies screen external 
markets and they make searching tasks cheaper and easier for companies (Hossain, 2012). 
Intermediary activities have recently been grouped into three categories interorganizational 
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networking activities; technology development and related activities, and other activities 
(Dazniel, 2010). The first category consists of supporting inward flows of knowledge from 
various sources (Dazniel, 2010), by providing functions of information scanning and 
processing (Howells, 2006). These intermediaries also support outward flows of knowledge 
from the firm to a range of different recipients. Technology development and related activities 
entails large multidisciplinary research institutes that specialize in testing and validating new 
technologies (Howells, 2006), finding alternative uses for technologies and intellectual 
property management associated with the use of new technologies created by public sector 
researchers (Dazniel, 2010). Other activities undertaken by intermediaries are usually activities 
that complement their networking and technology development activities, such as providing 
physical space or training sessions (Dazniel, 2010). 
Innovation intermediaries, have been known in the innovation management literature by 
different names, such as intermediary firms (Stankiewicz, 1995), Intermediaries (Shohert and 
Prevezer 1996), knowledge brokers (Hargadon and Sutton, 1997) or boundary organizations 
(Cash, 2001). This could be due to the lack of cross referencing of studies on this subject, or 
due to fact that these organizations can engage in all sorts of activities (Howells, 2006). 
Howells in 2006 is the first to define the concept of innovation intermediaries. However, the 
definition provided is only applicable if we consider intermediaries as organizations, and not 
intermediation as a function (Howells, 2006). If we were to consider intermediation as a 
function, we would not be able to come up with a working definition, because most firms 
already engage in at least some intermediation functions on their own, such as technology 
development (Dazniel, 2010). NineSigma (2000) and Innocentive (2001) are two examples of 
internet based intermediaries that focus on transferring knowledge (Chesbrough, 2006). These 
platforms use the crowdsourcing method, and have changed the innovation spectrum 
dramatically, and created a new industry (Hossain, 2012). These specialized intermediaries, 
apply the crowdsourcing method as a service for other organizations, to bridge the gap between 
solution seeking companies and external solvers (Lutgens, Pollok, Anton and Piller, 2014). The 
intermediaries achieve this by broadcasting the firm’s technological challenges to a large 
network of expert solvers that will attempt to solve the challenge (Inocrowd, 2011). 
 
2.3. Crowdsourcing  
The term Crowdsourcing was first defined by Jeff Howe in 2008 as “the act of taking a task 
traditionally performed by a designated agent (such as an employee or a contractor) and 
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outsourcing it, by making an open call to an undefined but large group of people.” (Howe, 
2008).  Even though it was only defined in 2008, because the rise of the internet allowed it to 
spread rapidly in recent years (Afuah and Tucci, 2012), crowdsourcing has been a very useful 
tool for managers for a long time now. One of the first ever recorded acts of outsourcing a task 
to the public in the form of an open call, was done in 1714 when the British navy offered a cash 
prize to whoever could find an elegant way of finding ships at sea, and called it the Longitude 
Prize (Afuah and Tucci, 2012).  
It is important to note, that Crowdsourcing has a strong focus on increasing R&D quality and 
reducing R&D costs (Leimeister et al., 2009), and it can be extremely effective at finding 
superior external knowledge (Brabham, 2008). Jeppesen and Lakhani showed that solvers from 
fields that are further away from the field of the problem broadcasted, are more likely to solve 
the problem (Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2009). 
The motivation of users to participate has been investigated thoroughly. After analyzing the 
habits of users on Istockphoto, Brabham concluded that the desire to develop individual skills, 
make money, and to have fun were the strongest motivators for participation (Brabham, 2010). 
Moreover, Leimeister et al. (2009) showed that users benefit from a mix of intrinsic as well as 
extrinsic motivation to participate, and that the right incentives can be used to activate 
participation intention. Similarly, Zheng, Li and Hou (2011) showed that a balanced view of 
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation is necessary, in order to encourage participation in 
crowdsourcing. Finally, research has consistently shown that Crowdsourcing is a more cost 
effective way of procuring innovation, than the traditional method (Leimeister et al., 2009; 
Afuah and Tucci, 2012). Schenk and Guittard, discussed the benefits of crowdsourcing 
showing that crowdsourcing initiatives are relatively low-cost, and can be used to reduce the 
risk undertaken by seeker firms (Schenk and Guittard, 2009). 
 
2.3.1. Types of crowdsourcing contests 
Crowdsourcing can take three forms: “open call”, “selective open call”, and “open search” 
(Piller and West, 2014). An “open call”, “broadcast search” (Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2009), or 
“innovation contest” (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008) is when a firm, facing an innovation problem, 
posts this problem to a large population of independent agents, and pays a cash prize to whoever 
comes up with the best solution (Piller and West, 2014). The main premise of this type of 
crowdsourcing is the fact that participation is dynamic and open to everyone who deems 
himself capable of solving a given problem (Yang et al., 2009; Afuah and Tucci, 2012; Howe, 
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2006). Whereas, open call contests call upon as much people as possible, for the other two 
types of crowdsourcing, participation is restricted. For “selective open call” crowdsourcing, 
firms identify key attributes that they believe solvers must have, such as the right expertise or 
background, and invite only the people who match these attributes to work on the project (Piller 
and West, 2014). Finally, “open search” crowdsourcing is mostly associated with lead user 
theory, developed by Von Hippel in 1989. In this case, firms engage in their own search efforts 
to identify suitable partners, and then invite them to join the co-creation activity (Piller and 
West, 2014). 
This study will focus exclusively on “open call” crowdsourcing, more specifically in how some 
design elements of innovation contests (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008), broadcasted by 
intermediaries, can be used to increase participation of solvers. Our analysis is limited to these 
challenges because they are the closest to the original definition of crowdsourcing by Howe 
(2006) (Piller and West, 2014), and because the Inocrowd platform has only hosted these types 
of challenges. 
 
2.3.2 Participation of Solvers in Crowdsourcing Contests 
In spite wide discussion two opposing effects were found, when investigating the effects of 
adding participants to innovation contests. The first is the “competition effect”, which states 
that adding more competitors to an innovation problem will cause underinvestment in effort by 
individual solvers (Taylor, 1995). Accordingly, limiting the number of participants is beneficial 
because investments are sunk (Che and Gale, 2003). To reduce this effect Fullerton and Mcafee 
state that the optimum number of solvers for innovation contests is just two (Fullerton and 
Mcafee, 1999). However, Terwiesch and Xu argue that having more participants working on 
an innovation contest could be preferable because the seeker would benefit from a more diverse 
set of solutions (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). This leads to the second effect, the “parallel path 
effect”, which states that the quality of the best solution submitted increases along with the 
number of competitors (Boudreau, Lacetera and Lakhani, 2009; Nelson,1961). Consequently, 
increasing the number of participants in a crowdsourcing contest leads to increased breadth and 
diversity of solutions (Terwiesh and Xu, 2008; Lakhani et al., 2007).  More recently, Boudreau 
Lacetera and Lakhani, showed that the two effects in fact coexist and that the average quality 
of solutions decreases when the number of competitors increases, while the best “individual 
score” or maximum performance increases along with the number of competitors (Boudreau, 
Lacetera and Lakhani, 2009). It is important to note that in the crowdsourcing contests 
considered in this study, only the best solution gets paid the cash prize and hence it is 
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preferable, for the seeker firms and for the intermediaries, to improve the maximum solution, 
by increasing the number of competitors (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). Terwiesch and Xu argue 
that since the seeker is concerned with the quality of the best solution submitted, it is preferable 
for the seeker to have 100 bad solutions and 1 great one, then 101 average solutions (Terwiesh 
and Xu, 2008).   
Consequently, the rest of the paper considers the fact that the underinvestment of individual 
effort exerted by each solver, caused by increasing the number of participants in a 
crowdsourcing contest (competition effect), can be outweighed by the “parallel path effect” 
(Terwiesh and Xu, 2008). Hence, we consider that it is preferable for seeker firms and for 
intermediaries to maximize participation in crowdsourcing contests because it improves their 
overall effectiveness, by increasing the quality of the best solution and the diversity of solutions 
submitted (Terwiesh and Xu, 2008). 
  
2.3.3 Monetary Award 
This design element of innovation contests is the most researched, and research as focused 
mainly on the structure (Cason et al., 2010) and amount of the awards (Snir and Hitt, 2013; 
Yang et al. 2009; Dipalantino and Vojnovic, 2009; Shao et al., 2011). There are three types of 
award structure: “winner takes all”, “multiple” or “proportional” awards. Cason et al. (2010) 
showed that multiple prizes enhance participation. However, the intermediaries considered in 
this study only engage in “winner takes all” type of tournaments, hence the other two types 
will be overlooked for the rest of this paper. One of the most researched topics on 
crowdsourcing is the motivation of users (solvers). Past literature has showed that the most 
efficient solvers are the ones that benefit from a mix of intrinsic motivation and extrinsic 
motivation (Brabam, 2010; Frey, Luthje and Haag, 2011; Leimester et al., 2009; Zheng, Li and 
Hou, 2011). Intrinsic motivation of solvers can be explained as the enjoyment or personal 
fulfillment that solvers feel while developing a solution (Frey, Luthje and Haag, 2011; 
Leimester et al., 2009). Extrinsic motivation can be explained as the need to get an external 
reward for the job performed (Leimester et al., 2009). Leimester and coleagues (2009), showed 
that there are different motives that have to fostered through incentives in order to activate 
participation in crowdsourcing contests. Specifically, the authors highlighted 4 motives, two 
extrinsic and two intrinsic. Learning, and self-marketing are the intrinsic motives. Learning 
relates to the access of knowledge of peers, mentors and experts, while self-marketing relates 
to the profiling options of the solvers. The extrinsic motives are social motives (appreciation 
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of organizer and peers) and direct compensation, which is the prize paid out to the winning 
solution. Accordingly, we can increase participation by increasing the direct compensation of 
solvers (Leimester et al., 2009). A vast number of studies support the previous statement since 
most research has showed that the higher the cash prize the higher the participation (Snir and 
Hitt, 2013; Yang et al., 2009; Dipalantino and Vojnovic, 2009; Shao et al., 2011), and the better 
the maximum performance (Archak,2010; Boudreau et al., 2009; Walter & Back, 2011).  When 
analyzing the strategic behavior of users of Taskcn, Yang et al. showed that users 
counterproductively choose tasks with higher expected rewards (Yang et al., 2009). Hence our 
first hypothesis is: 
H1: The greater the monetary awards the higher the participation in crowdsourcing contests. 
  
2.3.4 Project Type 
From reviewing the literature on innovation contests, it quickly becomes apparent that there 
are three types of innovation contests: “Ideation”; “Expertise based” and “Trial and error” 
determined by their technical and market uncertainty (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). Market 
uncertainty describes how well contest goals and expectations are defined, and allow solvers 
to anticipate whether the seeker will like his/her solution. And technical uncertainty, is whether 
the solution landscape is well defined, and allows the solvers to anticipate if the solution is 
feasible, before experimenting it (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). 
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From figure one, it is quite clear that Ideation problems have low technical uncertainty and 
high market uncertainty, because these usually are innovation problems with no clear 
specifications (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008), and are known as Ideastorming challenges in the 
Inocrowd platform. Expertise based problems are low on both technical as well as market 
uncertainty, these are usually engineering tasks. These projects are known in the Inocrowd 
platform as Practical challenges. 
Finally, “Trial and error” problems, are high on technical uncertainty but low on market 
uncertainty, because they usually require solutions to research problems with well-defined 
goals but with a very rugged solution landscape (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). These projects are 
called theoretical challenges by the Inocrowd platform.  
Previous investigations on project type have showed that ideation and trial-and-error projects 
are able to create higher profits for seekers if they have performance contingent awards, and 
that expertise and ideation problems are more suitable for an intermediary administered 
innovation contest than are trial-and-error projects (Terwiesch and Xu, 2008). 
Furthermore, studies into how project type affects participation have showed that, ideation 
projects are the ones with highest amounts of participation, because these projects have the 
most potential solvers, because they tend to have low technical uncertainty (Yang et al., 2009). 
Hence, our second Hypothesis states that the project type is an important predictor of the 
number of registered solvers in the contest thus:  
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H2: Ideation projects have more participation on average than do expertise and trial-and- 
error projects. 
 
2.3.5 Platform Maturity 
Platform maturity or Marketplace maturity can be defined as the overall age of a specific 
marketplace (Snir and Hitt, 2003), and it reflects changes in the market structure over time such 
as network effects and growth of the solver population (Snir and Hitt, 2003). Walter and Back 
(2011) showed in their study of the Atizo platform that platform maturity will positively 
influence the outcome of idea contests due to solver population growth and due to the existence 
of positive network effects (Walter and Back, 2011). Network effects are, simply defined, an 
intrinsic benefit that the solvers enjoy when they align their behavior with the behavior of 
others (Chen, Li and Zhang, 2016).  Finally, Chen, Li and Zhang showed that when seekers 
design extrinsic reward mechanisms while considering network effects, they are able to attract 
more participants with higher contributed efforts (Chen, Li and Zhang, 2016). Hence, we 
postulate:  
H3:  Higher platform maturity leads to higher amounts of participation in crowdsourcing 
contests. 
 
2.3.6 Anonymity 
Some companies prefer to remain anonymous when they post their innovation challenges 
online. The awareness of the company seeking to innovate has never been investigated before, 
however the influence of brand strength has, and research shows that the brand strength has a 
positive effect on participation (Walter and Back, 2011). But we can also analyze this issue 
from a motivational perspective. Leimester et al. derived a set of motives that have to be 
fostered in order to activate participation intention in solvers (Leimester et al., 2009). We 
believe that by remaining anonymous, the seeker firm is purposefully reducing the effects of 
the intrinsic motives (Learning and Self-marketing), because the solver will not be as interested 
in learning from a company that is unknown to the solver. And, by remaining anonymous the 
seeker is removing the self-marketing dimension as well, because some solvers use 
crowdsourcing as a channel for self-advertisement in order to seek new job opportunities 
(Leimester et al., 2009). Furthermore Zheng, li and Hou (2011) showed that participation 
intention depends of a mix of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and they showed that the 
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extrinsic motivation dimension includes the will to gain money and recognition (Zheng, Li and 
Hou, 2011), hence by remaining anonymous these seekers are intentionally removing the 
recognition and the self-marketing dimensions and will consequently reduce 
participation.  Hence, we hypothesize that: 
 
H4a: Challenges in which the seeker firm remains anonymous will have lower levels of 
participation, than challenges where the seeker firm is known. 
 
We also argue that the anonymity of seeker firms differently influences the participation of 
different project types. This is due to the natural difference between project types. Practical 
challenges have a rugged solution landscape as well as low market ambiguity, and Theoretical 
challenges have high technical and low market uncertainty (Terwiesh and Xu, 2008). We argue 
that by not disclosing their names, seeker firms are increasing the market uncertainty of these 
project types, this means that solvers will not be able to anticipate as well whether the seeker 
firms will like their solutions, and hence will be less likely to participate. This is especially 
important for Practical challenges which have low market and technical uncertainty. By 
purposefully remaining anonymous seeker firms are going to increase the technical and market 
uncertainty of these challenges, because solvers will have access to less information about the 
company, and hence will not be able to know if the seeker firm likes their ideas or if these can 
be implemented easily. We shall not consider Ideastorming challenges in this part of the study 
because the Inocrowd platform has never hosted one of these challenges where the seeker firm 
remained anonymous.      
H4b: Anonymity of seeker firms does not influence different project types in the same was
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3. Method  
3.1 Data 
We examined all of the challenges posted on the Inocrowd platform in order to determine 
which design elements can be used to influence participation in these contests. 
Inocrowd.com is the only Portuguese intermediary firm, which started in 2012, that 
specializes in hosting crowdsourcing contests for any company facing an innovation 
challenge, these companies are called “seeker” firms. Essentially, Inocrowd focuses on 
finding seeker firms, and broadcasting their innovation challenges, in the form of 
crowdsourcing contests, to a large network of researchers, called “solvers”, who will attempt 
to submit an innovative solution before the end of the deadline, given by the seeker firms. 
Once the deadline is reached all of the submitted proposals will be evaluated by the seeker 
firm, who will have to pick the most suitable solution and attempt to implement it.  
Inocrowd uses an “open call” approach to crowdsourcing, hence anyone can sign up and 
submit solutions to the challenges posted, before the deadline. It is important to note that the 
contests posted on the Inocrowd platform are on a “winner takes all” basis, which means that 
only the best solution will be awarded with the cash prize offered by the seeker firm. In 
essence, Inocrowd tries to bridge the innovation gap between the business and research 
communities. Some of the most prominent success cases are the Bosh, EDP and General 
Motors challenges that were all solved successfully. 
 
      3.2 Sample Procedure 
In order to create the data set, we manually collected all of the information available about 
every innovation challenge posted on the platform since the day it posted the first 
crowdsourcing contest in 29 of June of 2011 until the present day. We ended up with a dataset 
composed of 41 challenges. Each challenge has its own number of solutions submitted, number 
of registered solvers, contest duration, description length, Monetary award amount, project 
type, and brand of seeker firm, and all of this information was collected and put together in a 
database. 
 
3.3 Variables 
The analysis performed in this study uses variables that have been used in similar studies 
performed in the past (Archak, 2010; Boudreau et al., 2011, 2008; Shao et al., 2012; Snir & 
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Hitt, 2003; Yang et al., 2009). We analyzed performance as the number of solutions submitted, 
participation was measured in terms of number of registered solvers (NRS), and some design 
elements also known as contest characteristics namely, project type (Terwiesh and Xu, 2008), 
monetary award amount (Yang et al., 2009), anonymity of seeker firm, and platform maturity 
(Yang et al., 2009). 
 
3.3.1 Performance of crowdsourcing contests  
In order to determine the effects of adding more competitors to a crowdsourcing contest hosted 
by an intermediary start-up firm, we will use the number of solutions  
submitted as the only performance measurement tool. This only reflects the quantity of 
solutions submitted and not the quality. The reason this study overlooks quality of solutions is 
because we did not have access to the final solutions because they are often confidential to the 
seeker firms. Hence, we cannot make any considerations about whether the “parallel path 
effect” has a stronger influence than the “competition effect” on the participation and the 
outcome of crowdsourcing contests hosted by intermediary start-up companies. Our sample of 
43 innovation challenges has a 4.1 average of solutions submitted ranging from a minimum of 
0 to a maximum of 19. 
 
3.3.2 Participation in Crowdsourcing contests  
To measure participation this study uses the number of registered solvers (NRS) in each 
innovation challenge posted by the Inocrowd Platform. The crowdsourcing contests hosted by 
this platform have an “open call” approach, which means that anyone can register as a solver 
for any innovation challenge that is underway, at any time. Hence, participation can be 
measured as the number of solvers that registered to the challenge and attempted to solve the 
problem before the deadline. Th sample contains 41 innovation contests posted by the 
Inocrowd platform. Number of registered solvers in this sample averages 14 solvers per 
challenge and ranges between 1 and 53 solvers. 
 
3.3.3 Monetary award 
In this study, we consider Monetary award (MA) as a predictor of participation, because solvers 
are very extrinsically motivated (Brabam, 2010; Terwiesh and Xu, 2008). The contests 
considered in this study are on a “winner takes all” basis, which means that only the best 
solution is awarded with the cash prize at the end of the challenge. Prizes range from 0 to 
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50.000 €. In order to simplify the analysis, we created three categories of challenges based on 
their MA. Free challenges, where there is no cash prize, and there are 9 of these challenges in 
the sample. Low paying challenges are the ones that pay between 0 and 5000 €, and Inocrowd 
has hosted 24 of these challenges. Finally, high paying challenges are all of the challenges that 
pay more than 5000€ as the cash prize to the winning solver, the sample contains 10 of these 
challenges. It is important to note that the variable is measured in euros. The table below shows 
the challenges that have been posted on the Inocrowd platform and the average participation 
associated with each monetary award. 
 
Monetary awards N AVG NRS 
Free challenges 9 4.33 
Low paying 24 18.42 
High paying 10 19.00 
Total 43 15.60 
         Table 1 
3.3.4 Project type 
It was mentioned earlier that there are three types of crowdsourcing contests: Ideation, trial and 
error and expertise projects and their definitions were given above. It is important to have a 
distinction between them because some design elements influence these projects differently, 
depending on their type. The Inocrowd platform considers these project types, but has different 
names for them: ideation projects are known as “Ideastorming” contests and the platform has 
posted 5 of these challenges with an average NRS of around 32 registered solvers. Expertise 
based projects are called, on the Inocrowd platform, theoretical challenges and the platform 
has posted 14 of these challenges. Trial and error projects are known by Inocrowd as Practical 
challenges and the platform has solved 24 of these challenges since the day it started its 
operation. Table 2 shows the different project types hosted by the Inocrowd platform and shows 
their respective number of registered solvers. 
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Project type N AVG NRS 
Practical challenges 24 13.21 
Theoretical challenges 14 12.36 
IdeaStorming 5 36.20 
Total 43 15.60 
Table 2 
 
3.3.5 Platform maturity  
This variable measures the total amount of months that the platform has been open. We 
measured this variable by simply subtracting the crowdsourcing contest start date by the date 
when the platform was first opened the 29-06-2011. 
  
3.3.6 Anonymity 
The final variable to be considered in our study is whether the seeker firm remains 
anonymous when broadcasting their innovation challenges through the Inocrowd platform. In 
order to measure it we created a dichotomous variable where seeker firms can either reveal 
their identity or not. The Inocrowd platform has posted 11 challenges anonymously and 30 
challenges were posted without the seeker firms hiding their identity. The table below shows 
all of the challenges posted on the Inocrowd platform anonymously and non-anonymously 
 
Anonymity N Avg NRS 
Yes 11 10.18 
No 30 16.53 
Total 41 14.83 
Table 4
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4. Results 
 
4.1 ANOVA results 
In the first part of the analysis we ran 4 ANOVAS in order to compare the average participation 
of the challenges with, firstly the different amounts of monetary awards and found that there is 
a statistically significant difference between groups(F(2,42)=4.088, p=.024). Secondly, we 
looked at the average participation that each project type had and compared them with each 
other, and we also found a statistically significant difference of the NRS between project types 
(F(2,42)=7.854, p=.001). Thirdly, we compared the average participation of challenges that were 
posted anonymously versus that were posted non-anonymously, but the relationship was not 
statistically significant (F(2,42)=2.200; p=.146). Fourthly, we compared the mean participation 
of different project types, when they were posted anonymously or non-anonymously and 
compared them with each other, and we found that there is a statistically significant difference 
between groups (F(2,42)=6.152; p=.001).  
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Table 4                                                                                                              *p<.05 
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In this section we will describe the results that were obtained by running 4 ANOVAS in order 
to understand the effects of certain design elements of crowdsourcing contests on the 
participation of solvers in these contests.   
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In order to test H1, where we state that increasing the monetary award of crowdsourcing 
contests increases the participation of solvers in these contests, we ran a one-way ANOVA 
between the monetary award and the NRS. This allowed us to identify the average number of 
registered solvers, NRS, associated with crowdsourcing contests that have different monetary 
awards. We found that there is a statistically significant difference between groups (NRSfree= 
4,33, NRSawardlow = 18.42; NRSawardhigh = 19, p< .05; F(2,42)=4.088, p=.024). A Tuckey post hoc test 
showed that the average participation of solvers in crowdsourcing contests (NRS) of free 
challenges, is statistically and significantly lower than the NRS of low paying challenges 
(NRSawardlow = 18.42; p=.026) and high paying challenges (NRSawardhigh = 19; p=.054). However, 
there was no significant difference between the NRS of high paying and low paying challenges 
(p=.993).  
In order to test H2, where we state that Ideastorming challenges have more participation, we 
ran a second ANOVA which shows the average NRS that is associated with different project 
types (NRSpractical= 13.21, NRStheoretical = 12.36; NRSideastorming = 36.2, p< .001). The test showed 
that there was a statistically significant difference between groups (F(2,42)=7.854, p=.001). A 
Tuckey post-hoc test showed that the average NRS of Ideastorming challenges is statistically 
and significantly higher than the NRS of Practical challenges (NRSpractical= 13.21; p= .001), and 
of Theoretical challenges (NRStheoretical = 12.36; p=.002). However, there was no significant 
difference between the NRS of Practical and Theoretical challenges (p=.977).  
To test H4a, where we state that challenges where the seeker firm remains anonymous have 
less participation, we run an analysis of variance between NRS and the anonymity of seeker 
firms. The results show the different levels of participation of solvers in challenges where the 
seeker remains anonymous. Challenges in which seeker firms do not remain anonymous have 
and average participation of NRSanon= 17.42 registered solvers, whereas challenges in which 
the company chooses to remain anonymous only have NRSnon-anon=10. 12 registered solvers on 
average. However, these results show that there isn’t a statistically significant difference in the 
participation of anonymous and non-anonymous challenges (F(1,41)=2.200, p=.146).   
The final ANOVA consisted of testing the interaction effect of anonymity and project type on 
the participation of solvers, in order to determine whether anonymity of seekers firms 
influences different project types in the same way. The results showed that there was a 
statistically significant interaction between the effects of anonymity and project type on the 
NRS (F(2,38)=5.957, p=0.019). We then analyzed the simple main effects which showed that 
there is a statistically significant difference between practical challenges posted anonymously 
and non-anonymously (F(1,22)=4.975;p=.036). However, when we analyzed the simple main 
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effects of Theoretical challenges, we found that there wasn’t a statistically significant 
difference between Theoretical challenges posted anonymously and non-anonymously 
F(1,12)=2.766, p=.122).  
 
4.2 Regression results 
We also ran a hierarchical multiple regression, in order to create a model that accurately 
predicts the participation levels of crowdsourcing contests. This added analysis will allow us 
to learn more about the relationship between certain design elements and the NRS. In the first 
step we predicted NRS from the monetary award. In the second step we added the project type 
and the platform maturity. The third step predicts NRS from the monetary award, project type, 
platform maturity and the anonymity of seeker firms. In the fourth step, we predicted NRS 
using the monetary award, the platform maturity and the interaction effect between the project 
type and the anonymity of seeker firms.  
Model 1: NRS=α+β1M
Model 2: NRS=α+β1MA+ β2ProjTyp+ β3PlatformMaturity 
Model 3: NRS=α+β1MA+ β2ProjTyp+ β3PlatformMaturity+ β4Anon 
Model 4: NRS=α+β1MA+ β3PlatformMaturity+ β2ProjTyp + β4Anon+ β5ProjTyp*Anon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results and Discussion  29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5                                                                                      *p<.05 
                                                                                                **p<.001 
 
The following section describes the results obtained from the multiple regressions. The 
regressions were run in order to identify the effects that each design element has on the 
participation of crowdsourcing contests hosted by intermediary start-up companies.  
The monetary award explains 9% of the variability in the NRS (adjusted R^2=.092). The model 
is appropriate to explain NRS (F(1, 41) =5.233, β = .336, t(42) = 2.288, p =.027).  
In the second step of the model we added 2 more predictor variables, the project type, and the 
Platform maturity. This model now explains 22% of the variability in the NRS (adjusted R^2= 
.223). The addition of the new predictors in this step significantly explains the incremental 
variance of NRS (ΔR^2=.165 p<.05). The results also show that we can significantly predict 
Variables  Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 4 
Monetary 
award 
β1 0.336 0.31 0.269 0.233 
T 2.288 2.04 1.621 1.443 
p value .027 .048 .113 .157 
Project type β2  0.481 0.477 1.474 
T  2.849 2.8 2.709 
p value  .007 .008 .01 
Platform 
maturity 
β3  0.376 0.399 0.519 
T  2.192 2.258 2.853 
p value  .034 .03 .007 
Anonymity β4   0.103 0.938 
T   0.627 2.209 
p value   .534 .05 
Interaction 
effect 
β5    -1.425 
T    -1.923 
p value    .062 
R^2  0.113 0.278 0.286 0.351 
Adj R^2  0.092 0.223 0.211 0.263 
F values  5.233 * 5.018 
** 
3.803 * 3.998** 
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NRS from the three predictors F(3,42)=5.018, p=.005). The monetary award (β1 = .310, t(42) 
=2.040 , p=.048 ), the Project type ( β2 = .481, t(42) =2.849 , p=.007 ) and the platform maturity 
(β3 = .376, t(42) =2.192 , p=.034)  have a positive and significant relationships with the NRS 
of a crowdsourcing contest. 
In the third step of the model we added a fourth predictor variable, the Anonymity of seeker 
firms. This model explains 21% of the variability in the NRS (adjR^2=.211). The addition of 
the fourth predictor does not significantly explain the incremental variance of NRS 
(ΔR^2=.007, p>.05). The results also show that we can predict NRS from these four predictors 
significantly (F(4,38)=3.803, p=.011). The monetary award (β1 = .269, t(42) =1.621 , p=.113) 
and the Anonymity of seeker firms  (β4 = .103, t(42) =0.627 , p=.534) have a positive but non-
significant effect on NRS. The Project type (β2 = .477, t(42) =2.800 , p=.008) and the platform 
maturity( β3 = .399, t(42) =2.258 , p=.030 )  have  positive and significant effects on the 
Participation of a crowdsourcing contest. 
The fourth and final step consisted in adding the interaction effect of the anonymity with the 
project type. This model explains 26% of the variability of in NRS(adjR^2=.263). The results 
show that we can predict significantly the NRS from these predictors (F(5,37)=3.998, p=.005). 
The monetary award (β1 = .233, t(42) =.1.628 , p >.05) has a positive but not significant 
relationship with the NRS. The project type (β2 = .1.474, t(42) =2.709 , p=.010), the anonymity 
of seeker firms (β4 = .938, t(42) =2.029 , p=.050) and the platform maturity (β3 = 0.519, t(42) 
=2.853 , p =.007) have positive and significant effects on the NRS. The interaction effect 
between the Anonymity and the project type (β5 = -1.425, t(42) = -1.923 , p =.062) has a 
negative and partial significant effect on the NRS (p-value =.062).   
These results show that it is possible to predict the participation of crowdsourcing contests 
using the design elements mentioned above, which means that they could be adjusted to 
increase the participation in a given crowdsourcing contest. 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
The results obtained in the two-previous sections will now be described and interpreted in 
terms of their academic and managerial implications and relevance towards our Hypothesis.  
In the first ANOVA we compared the average number of registered solvers between free, low 
pay and high pay challenges posted on the InoCrowd platform. We found that there is a 
significant difference between free challenges and the other two. However, a post hoc test 
revealed that there is no significant difference in the participation of high pay and low pay 
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challenges, this leads us to reject H1, where we stated that increasing the monetary awards of 
innovation challenges posted on the Inocrowd platform would increase participation in these 
challenges.  This could be due to the effect documented by Yang and colleagues (2009) who 
stated that challenges with higher cash prizes are associated with higher complexity of the 
problem (Yang et al, 2008), and increased complexity leads to less participation due to an 
increase of the time cost of the challenge (Yang et al ,2009).  
Our results confirm Terwiesh and Xu’s model. Ideastorming challenges have more registered 
solvers on average than the other two project types. This can be explained by Terwiesh and 
Xu’s model of innovation contests. The authors model a solver’s performance as a function of 
the solver’s expertise, which reflects the solvers past experience, of the improvement effort of 
each solver, which shows activities such as running a thorough literature review or patent 
search, and of the stochastic nature of problem solving in innovation, captured by noise 
variables. Since Ideastorming challenges are non-detailed challenges where seekers are simply 
looking for new ideas, there is little need for solvers to have a lot of expertise or improvement 
efforts which increases the number of potential solvers that will be able to understand the 
problem requirements and register for the challenge. Consequently, H2 is accepted. 
 The analysis of variance between anonymity and the NRS did not yield any statistically 
significant results; hence we reject Hypothesis 4a, where we hypothesized that challenges 
posted anonymously would have less participation than challenges posted non-anonymously.   
Finally, we wanted to understand whether the anonymity of seeker firms had the same effect 
on different project types. We found that there was a statistically significant difference between 
groups (F(2,38)=5.957, p=0.019). We also found that there is a statistically significant difference 
in participation between Practical challenges posted anonymously and practical challenges 
posted non-anonimously. Essentially, seeker firms that post Practical challenges anonymously 
on the InoCrowd Platform will have an average participation of NRSPract-anon=6.89 registered 
solvers, whereas if they choose to not remain anonymous they will benefit from an increased 
amount of participation (NRSPract-nonanon= 17). Furthermore, Theoretical challenges have higher 
amounts of participation when posted anonymously (NRStheore-anon=25) than when the seeker 
firm is known (NRStheore-nonanon=10,25), however this result is not statistically significant. 
Nonetheless, this confirms our Hypotheses 4b, where we state that anonymity of seeker firms 
does not influence the participation of different project types in the same way.  
The second part of our analysis consisted in running a sequential multiple regression in order 
to create a model that allows seeker firms and intermediaries to predict the participation in 
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innovation challenges. The model created predicts the NRS of crowdsourcing contests as a 
function of the Monetary award, the platform maturity, the project type, the anonymity of 
seeker firms and the interaction effect between project type and anonymity of seeker firms. The 
final model showed that we can predict significantly the NRS from these predictors 
(F(5,37)=3.998, p=.005), and explains 26% of the variability in the NRS(adjR^2=.263). This also 
confirms the third hypotheses, where we stated that increased platform maturity leads to higher 
levels of participation in crowdsourcing contests, because the platform maturity (β = 0.519, 
t(42) =2.853 , p =.007) has positive and significant effect on the NRS, which consistent with 
the presence of positive network effects (Snir and Hitt, 2003 ; Walter and Back, 2011). 
Now that we know the effect that each design element has on the participation of solvers in 
crowdsourcing contests hosted by intermediary firms, we can deduce some managerial 
implications regarding these design elements. It is important to note that this analysis was run 
in order to make these contests more effective. Firstly, we found that crowdsourcing challenges 
with a cash prize are able to capture more solvers than challenges with no cash prizes. We also 
found that there is no significant increase in the participation of solvers when we increase the 
amount of cash paid out to the winning solver. Hence, the crowdsourcing contests posted on 
the Inocrowd platform must always have some sort of cash prize, even a small one may have 
large implications on the participation of solvers in these contests. Secondly, we found that 
Ideastorming challenges have the most participation when compared to other project types, due 
to their nature. We also found that participation in crowdsourcing contests increases with the 
platform maturity. This means that along time, the participation of solvers in crowdsourcing 
contests will increase due to positive network effects. Finally, we found that it is very important 
for the seeker firms to know exactly what Project type their innovation contest belongs. This 
is because it will allow the seeker firm to better decide on whether to remain anonymous or 
not. Basically, for theoretical challenges it is preferable for seeker firms to remain anonymous 
whereas for practical challenges it is preferable for seekers to not remain anonymous, because 
this will allow these challenges have more participants. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This study analyzed all of the innovation contests posted on the Inocrowd platform in order to 
determine the effects of design elements on the participation of solvers in these contests. This 
analysis will allow innovation intermediaries and “seeker” firms to design innovation contests 
that will have higher amounts of registered solvers (participation), and consequently will 
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benefit from more high-quality solutions.  We postulated that increased monetary awards lead 
to higher participation, in accordance with past investigations of this topic (Snir and Hitt, 2013; 
Yang et al., 2009; Dipalantino and Vojnovic, 2009; Shao et al., 2011)). We found that 
challenges with no Monetary awards have on average less participation than challenges that 
offer a cash prize to the winning solver. However, we did not find a significant difference 
between challenges that have a low cash prizes and challenges that have a high cash prizes, 
which means that simply increasing the monetary award of an innovation challenge will not 
result in higher participation, contrary to what had been showed in past investigations. For 
managers of intermediary platforms this result means that posting challenges with very high 
monetary awards does not necessarily mean that the contest will have high amounts of 
participation. Consequently, innovation intermediaries should be wary of what challenges they 
post. 
 We then tested the effect that the project type has on participation of innovation contests, and 
we hypothesized that Ideastorming challenges have the highest participation of the three project 
types, this effect had been showed before by Terwiesh and Xu (2008) and it was confirmed by 
our results. This means that in the future, Intermediary firms should focus more on posting 
Ideastorming challenges because these challenges benefit from more participation, and hence 
are more effective. 
  Furthermore, we tested the effect of platform maturity on the participation of solvers in 
innovation challenges in order to prove the existence of positive network effects and growing 
population of solvers (Walter and Back, 2011), and we found that indeed, higher platform 
maturity is associated with more participation in innovation contests. This means that over time 
the Intermediary will benefit from more participation, thus challenges that are very complex in 
nature and that are not expected to have a lot of participation could be postponed to a later date, 
and benefit from higher NRS.  
 Finally, we wanted to identify the effect of anonymity of seeker firms on the participation of 
crowdsourcing contests. We found that there was no significant difference in the participation 
of challenges posted anonymously or non-anonymously. Nonetheless, we tested the effect of 
the anonymity across different project types, and we concluded that Practical challenges have 
more participation when posted non-anonymously, whereas Theoretical Challenges benefit 
from the opposite effect. For the innovation intermediary this means that when a seeker firm 
wants to post a practical challenge, the manager of the Intermediary should post the challenge 
non-anonymously. Whereas if the seeker wanted to post a Theoretical challenge we would 
advice the intermediary to do the opposite. 
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In summary, this paper provides us with a framework that can be used to increase the 
participation of crowdsourcing contests by slightly adjusting some design elements of these 
challenges. Managers of intermediary firms hosting innovation contests can now make 
estimations on the participation of innovation challenges based on their design elements, and 
can now advice seeker firms on what cash prize should be awarded, the types of challenges 
that should be posted, when they should be posted and whether they should post them 
anonymously or non-anonymously. 
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5. Limitations and future research  
 
This study has a few limitations that can be used to help us delineate some future research 
topics.  
Firstly, our sample of 43 innovation challenges posted on the InoCrowd platform was simply 
to small This is due to the fact that the Portuguese innovation intermediary market is still 
developing and Portuguese companies are still slightly sceptic over this new type of business, 
future research must have a larger sample in order to make significant contributions to this field 
of research. 
Secondly, the performance measure used in this study is incomplete. Past investigations of 
crowdsourcing performance have focused on both the quantity and the quality of solutions 
submitted. However, this study only considers the amount (quantity) of solutions submitted, 
this is due to the fact that we did not have access to all of the solutions posted, because these 
are often confidential to seeker firms. Even if we did have access to all of the solutions there 
would have to be a solution quality measurement tool that can be used to analyze all of the 
solutions submitted. Hence, future research should focus not only on the quantity of solutions 
submitted but also on the quality of these solutions. 
Finally, this study overlooks a lot of other design elements that have been shown to influence 
the participation of solvers on crowdsourcing contests. The reason we overlooked the other 
design elements is because, we did not have access to this information. Nonetheless, future 
research must consider all of the other design elements that have been shown to influence 
participation of solvers, such as problem complexity, project duration, award structure, and 
many more. 
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